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Abstract 
We discuss the ‘gloomy’ side of firms’ embeddedness in networks of inter-firm partnerships. We 
propose a nested understanding of the effects of three levels of overembeddedness—
environmental, inter-organizational and dyadic overembeddedness—on subsequent inter-firm 
partnership formation and argue for a joint examination of these three levels and their interactions 
over time. As a whole, increases in firms’ embeddedness will generate decreasing returns to the 
firms involved, prompting (i) the search for and attachment to novel partners and (ii) the 
dissolution of extant partnerships. On the flipside, overembeddedness thus sparks network 
evolution—by cueing firms to look beyond their embedded partnerships. (100 words)
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The past few decades have witnessed an unprecedented growth in the formation of inter-
firm partnerships in a wide variety of fields (Hagedoorn 2002; Powell and Grodal 2005). 
Increasingly, scholars have come to view the formation of such inter-firm partnerships as socially 
embedded events (e.g., Gulati 1999; Hagedoorn 2006; Walker  1997). That is, the literature 
increasingly shows appreciation of existing social structures that surround potential partner firms, 
and the history of prior ties between them, which has significantly furthered our understanding of 
inter-firm partnership formation. For example, Gulati (1995a) demonstrates that past partnerships 
between two firms cue the formation of subsequent ones, Garcia-Pont and Nohria (2002) find that 
the density of ties in the group of firms surrounding two potential partners affects the likelihood 
of tie formation between them, and Hagedoorn (1993) shows that firms’ sectoral embeddedness 
significantly influences their propensity to engage in new partnerships. The key message of 
contributions like these is that inter-firm partnership formation does not find place in isolation, 
but rather does so in an embedded manner (Granovetter 1985; Gulati and Gargiulo 1999). 
Many contributions demonstrate that social embeddedness positively affects inter-firm 
partnership formation because it provides firms with e.g. information on available partners, their 
capabilities, and credibility. However, a small number of contributions also suggest that the effect 
of embeddedness on new partnership formation is not necessarily positive. Under conditions of 
increasing social embeddedness, firms could face decreasing opportunities for the formation of 
valuable new partnerships with others embedded in the same partnership network (e.g., Burt 
1992; Duysters  2003; Hagedoorn  2007; Uzzi 1997). In other words, there may be a 
‘gloomy’ side to firms’ embeddedness in their partnership network due to the over-entrenched 
nature of well-embedded inter-firm ties. In this chapter, we propose that this over-entrenchment 
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cues firms to establish partnerships with un-embedded others, and gradually dissolve those with 
extant ones. Together, these spark a network’s evolution. 
We explore the gloomy side of embeddedness by distinguishing several distinct yet 
interrelated levels of overembeddedness and their separate and joint effects on inter-firm 
partnership formation. In so doing, we follow up on extant work by e.g. Dacin  (1999), 
Gnyawali and Madhavan (2001), Hagedoorn (2006) and Simsek  (2003), who each propose 
interactive, multi-level conceptions of embeddedness that might provide us with a more in-depth 
understanding of the relationship between social embeddedness and inter-firm partnership 
formation. We illustrate that we can further our understanding of inter-firm partnership formation 
and, more specifically, firms’ choice of partners, through a multi-level, longitudinal analysis of 
the increasing embeddedness and eventual overembeddedness of firms in their networks of 
external partnerships. 
Our contribution is broadly twofold. First, we contribute a number of explanations of 
changes in the patterns of inter-firm network ties that stress their highly endogenous nature (cf. 
Gulati and Gargiulo 1999; Madhavan  2008). In a large number of settings, network patterns 
are path-dependent. We show how an understanding of the mechanisms that underpin such path-
dependencies is important for explaining the dissolution of extant ties and the formation of novel 
ones. Second, we argue that the effects of embeddedness on a network’s evolution are complex 
because of their multi-level nature. One cannot study the effects at one level without properly 
accounting for variance at, and interactions with and between, other levels. Thinking about the 
evolution of networks in a multi-level fashion brings to the fore the complex dynamics at and 
between the individual embeddedness levels (cf. Hagedoorn 2006). 
In this chapter, we proceed as follows. First, we present an outline of our understanding of 
several levels of social embeddedness, the interactions between these different levels, and their 
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individual and combined effects on inter-firm partnership formation. Second, we subsequently 
discuss individual levels of overembeddedness, their possible effects on future inter-firm 
partnership formation, and the consequences of the interaction effects between different levels of 
overembeddedness. Lastly, we formulate some propositions that serve to guide theoretical and 
empirical development. 
Although this chapter is conceptual and theoretical in nature, we provide illustrative 
evidence to exemplify our main line of reasoning. In particular, we present illustrations of the 
effects of overembeddedness in the context of R&D partnership networks in the information 
technology industry during the 1990s. Our specific focus is on IBM, one of the major players in 
the industry. We took the information for these examples from the MERIT-CATI database on 
cooperative R&D agreements (see Hagedoorn 2002). 
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A vast body of previous work has introduced a differentiation of several levels of social 
embeddedness that affect the formation of relatively new forms of economic organization such as 
inter-firm partnerships (Dacin  1999; Granovetter 1992; Gulati and Gargiulo 1999; 
Hagedoorn 2006; Hite 2003; Lam 1997; Simsek  2003; Uzzi 1997). Most of the extant work 
has, in broad terms, distinguished between structural embeddedness and relational embeddedness 
(Gulati 1998). Structural embeddedness refers to the broader environmental setting of the social 
relationships in which economic organizations find themselves. Relational embeddedness refers 
to the specific dyadic relationships in pairs of related economic organizations.  
In line with Hagedoorn (2006), we take this differentiation one step further by making a 
distinction into three separate levels of embeddedness of economic organizations, i.e. their 
environmental embeddedness, their inter-organizational embeddedness and their dyadic 
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embeddedness. One of the main advantages of such a differentiated understanding of the concept 
of embeddedness is that it allows for empirical tests that peal apart the micro-, meso-, and macro-
level dimensions of embeddedness. Our particular differentiation of embeddedness resonates the 
recommendations by, among others, Dacin  (1999), Gnyawali and Madhavan (2001), Gulati 
and Gargiulo (1999) and Smelser and Swedberg (1994) to further specify the concept of 
embeddedness in such a way that it can be applied in a specific and empirically relevant context. 
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At the most wide-ranging level of social embeddedness that affects inter-firm partnership 
formation, i.e. environmental embeddedness, we think of the sectoral, industry-specific 
propensity to build inter-firm partnerships.
1
 The larger the environmental embeddedness, the 
more firms are tied together beyond their immediate circle of partnerships into an overarching 
industry network. 
A considerable body of work has established that sectors of industry differ widely with 
respect to the degree to which firms engage in partnerships (Contractor and Lorange 2002; 
Hagedoorn 2002; Oster 1999; Yu and Tang 1992). In general, firms in high-tech industries 
engage in partnerships more frequently than those in medium- and low-tech industries. This has 
led to a lop-sided distribution of inter-firm partnerships across industries. Powell and DiMaggio 
(1983) explain that it is through a process of informed imitation, or ‘mimetic isomorphism’, that 
firms cope with uncertainty and ambiguity. By modeling their actions on successful others, firms 
                                                 
 
1
  We define inter-firm partnerships as all forms of cooperation between firms that share 
knowledge and resources through formal agreements that can be governed through either equity-
based joint ventures or a range of non-equity, contractual agreements. 
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avoid unnecessary investments in searching for and weighing the alternative avenues to economic 
success. Abrahamson and Rosenkopf (1993) also argue that such modeling, or the existence of 
so-called bandwagons, can occur in a vast array of situations in which ambiguity with respect to 
economic returns is the common denominator. Moreover, in such ambiguous and uncertain 
environments, inter-firm partnerships may serve to obtain legitimacy in the market (Dacin  
2007). This may be one of the possible explanations for the omnipresence of inter-firm 
partnerships in high-tech industries, which are typically characterized by higher levels of 
uncertainty, ambiguity and change than medium- and low-tech industries. 
As an example, in the beginning of the eighties the call for compatibility between 
different parts of information systems prompted many incumbents to join their efforts in co-
owned ventures (Harrigan 1985). The consecutive examples set by firms like IBM and Hitachi in 
terms of engaging in these inter-firm partnerships were soon amplified at the industry level (see 
e.g., Hagedoorn 2002). Gulati (1995a) found results that are consistent with this line of reasoning 
as he determined that, in three different industries, aggregate alliance formation at the industry 
level significantly influenced dyadic alliance formation between 1980 and 1989.  
The existing partnership distribution for industries does not necessarily imply that the 
sectoral opportunity to engage in partnerships is given and stable over time. The research 
mentioned in the above merely indicates that in many high-tech industries and dynamic sectors 
inter-firm partnerships currently are a more familiar phenomenon than in other industries. Such 
familiarity is relevant as it indicates the degree to which firms find themselves in larger industrial 
settings where many other firms are also engaged in inter-firm partnerships. 
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The inter-organizational embeddedness of inter-firm partnerships is the next level of 
embeddedness where inter-firm networks are created by groups of firms or strategic blocks. 
These groups or strategic blocks refer to “...a set of firms that are connected more densely to each 
other than to other firms in the industry…” (Nohria and Garcia-Pont 1991: 106). Early work by 
Harrigan (1985) already indicated the relevance of understanding the role of these groups, which 
she described as constellations of interacting firms (see also Gomes-Casseres 1996; Granovetter 
1994). In such groups, firms are tied together by a network of relatively strong ties where firms 
maintain and replicate multiple ties within their group (Gimeno 2004; Nohria and Garcia-Pont 
1991; Vanhaverbeke and Noorderhaven 2001). This understanding of embeddedness in terms of 
groups relates to the concept of small worlds where inter-firm networks are clique-like settings of 
firms. The density and tie strength within these groups is typically high, whereas the strength of 
ties connecting different groups remains low (Schilling and Phelps 2007; Watts 1999).  
Most studies on groups of firms largely echo the seminal contribution by Coleman (1988), 
which argues that being part of a dense group of network actors is advantageous since it fosters 
trust development and cooperation among group members. The dense structure gives rise to 
obligations and sanctioning behavior conducive to the functioning of the group. In addition, it 
contributes to increased exchange efficiencies among group members (Soda  2008). The 
inter-organizational embeddedness of inter-firm partnerships leads to a form of generalized 
exchange, which we understand to represent an intricate web of dependencies and informational 
spillovers that reaches beyond mere dyadic reciprocity (Levine and Kurzban 2006; Takahashi 
2000). 
Research by, among others, Anand and Khanna (2000), Dyer and Singh (1998), and 
Gulati (1998) indeed indicates that both the familiarity of firms with partnering and their 
interactions within groups of relatively densely connected firms increase the likelihood that firms 
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will engage in new partnerships. Both firms’ familiarity and their interactions establish 
embeddedness mechanisms that prompt the endogenous evolution of inter-organizational network 
ties (cf. Gulati and Gargiulo 1999). More generally, based on insights from social network 
theory, we note that firms that become well-embedded in these networks accumulate 
informational advantages that increase their propensity to engage in new partnerships (Freeman 
1979; Gulati 1999; Wasserman and Faust 1994). 
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At the third level of embeddedness we find dyadic embeddedness, which can be 
understood in the context of repeated ties within pairs of firms (Gulati 1995b; Gulati and 
Gargiulo 1999). Dyer and Singh (1998) and Gulati (1995a) explain that firms will most probably 
enter into partnerships with firms with which they have collaborated before. This repeated tie 
effect likely creates strong cohesive ties between firms through frequent interactions. These 
strong ties are solid and reciprocal relationships that create a basis for trust and closeness between 
partners. Trust and closeness are believed to lead to dyadic reciprocation over time, which entails 
the “...extension of benefits to transacting partners…” and vice versa “…when a new situation 
arises…” (Uzzi 1996b: 678). Unlike the abovementioned generalized exchange inherent in inter-
organizational embeddedness, the notion of dyadic embeddedness thus entails a more restricted 
form of exchange in which the two actors in a tie reciprocate to each other only (Takahashi 2000; 
Uzzi 1996b). 
Apart from the repeated nature of partnerships, dyadic embeddedness also refers to the 
simultaneous operation of multiple partnerships between two parties, or a combination of 
elements comprising, what Gimeno and Woo (1996) label ‘economic multiplexity’ (for a 
discussion of the evolution of dyadic ties, see Hite 2008). In a partnership that is multiplex, 
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several partnerships in a dyad may exist that serve to regulate symbiotic, competitive, and 
commensalistic interdependencies (Pfeffer and Nowak 1976). Evolving routines in e.g. the 
commensalistic ‘dimension’ of a multiplex partnership may aid in straightening out possible 
complications in e.g. the competitive dimension. As such, multiplexity adds to the dyadic 
reciprocation over time by enabling the contemporaneous conservation and continuation of 
simultaneous ties. 
Possible reasons for a sustained preference for repeated or simultaneous dyadic 
partnerships are, among others, the costly and time-consuming nature of both the search for 
trustworthy and valuable partners and the final selection process of those partners. In addition, 
changing partners increases the risk that other relationships with existing partners will be 
dissolved. As relational trust becomes embedded in repeated ties between firms, it positively 
affects the prolongation and stability of their relationship (Gulati 1995b; Nooteboom 1997). 
Zollo  (2002) argue that the development of inter-organizational routines is both an 
antecedent to and consequence of the occurrence of dyadic embeddedness: routines develop 
through repeated interactions with the same partner and serve to smoothen the interactions in 
subsequent partnerships. Hence, such routines serve as an endogenous partnership development 
mechanism. Consequently, firms prefer to engage in local search and replicate their existing ties 
rather than search for novel ones. 
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Recent contributions (Dacin  1999; Dansereau  1999; Hagedoorn 2006; Hite 
2003) stress that individual levels of embeddedness are indeed important for understanding the 
effect of social embeddedness on inter-firm partnering. However, we can gain a more intricate 
understanding of the complex nature of this relationship in the analysis of the nested interaction 
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of multiple levels of embeddedness (Dacin  1999; Gnyawali and Madhavan 2001). The core 
argument for such a nested perspective is that the combined environmental, inter-organizational 
and dyadic embeddedness of partnering firms exercise a multiplicative, interacting effect on 
future joint partnering (Hagedoorn 2006). This implies that patterns of sectoral inter-firm 
partnership formation, as well as the specifics of groups of partnering firms and the history of 
pairs of firms, jointly affect future partnership formation. 
Inter-firm partnership formation is rooted in the dyadic embeddedness between partnering 
firms, which itself is affected by inter-organizational embeddedness in terms of the broader 
experience of firms with partnering and their surrounding networks. This combination of 
different levels of embeddedness is overarched and reinforced further by an environmental 
embeddedness that is characterized by a set of industry-based forces that additionally shape the 
nature of firms’ partnering activities (Hagedoorn 2006). However, these effects should be seen in 
a dialectic context, where it is not only the effect of the higher levels of embeddedness on 
embeddedness at lower levels, the process also works in the opposite direction. The more firms 
engage in repeated ties, increasing dyadic embeddedness, the more this affects inter-
organizational embeddedness as the density of in-group ties between firms increases (Hite, 2008). 
This, in turn, has an effect on the environmental embeddedness of inter-firm partnerships, as 
partnership formation in an industry increases. 
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Many contributions—whether considering individual-level embeddedness effects or the 
interaction of multiple levels—stress the positive effects of social embeddedness on partnership 
formation. Note that this is exactly what we have done to this point. At some point in time, 
however, increased partnership formation might create overembeddedness (Uzzi 1997) in which 
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case firms face fewer opportunities for entering into valuable new partnerships. As explained by 
e.g. Burt (1992) and Gargiulo and Benassi (2000), a concrete effect of overembeddedness would 
eventually be the declining propensity of network players to form, what could be considered as, 
redundant partnerships. An over-dependence on a particular group of partners and diminishing 
information gains through additional partnerships within the same group of firms are known to 
play a role in this overembeddedness effect (Chung  2000; Duysters  2003; Gulati 
1995b; Saxton 1997; Uzzi 1996b). This effect is most apparent at the level of pairs of firms, i.e. 
the level of dyadic embeddedness (Chung  2000; Gulati 1995b), but depending on the 
number of (potential) partners in networks and industries, the effect of overembeddedness can 
take place at each level of embeddedness.  
Our understanding of overembeddedness is that, up to a certain threshold, the 
embeddedness of inter-firm partnerships parallels a growth of new partnerships that generates 
useful new information (see Figure 1). Beyond a certain point, where social embeddedness 
reaches its maximum in terms of valuable new partnerships—the grey area in Figure 1—there is 
an increasing decline of new information gains (Hagedoorn  2007). Additional partnerships 
then lead to decreasing marginal returns to the firms involved. Consequently, the potential for 
useful new partnerships with existing partners, within existing groups of interconnected firms, 
and within the industry declines (Duysters  2003; Kenis and Knoke 2002; Uzzi 1996b, 1997). 
In short, the three embeddedness mechanisms introduced in the above gradually alter the 
opportunity structure faced by the firms in the partnership network. Here, we propose that a direct 
consequence of this process is the shift in a firm’s partner choice (cf. Hagedoorn  2007), 
which will coincide with the dissolution of overembedded partnerships. 
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As continued local cooperation with existing partners, within existing groups of 
interconnected firms, and within the industry’s web of partnerships, becomes less fruitful, firms 
will increasingly detach from such existing, ‘local’ partners and select ‘nonlocal’ ones, i.e. those 
in different groups and/or industries. The process of embedding thus eventually leads to 
overembeddness, which sparks the dissolution of extant ties and the concurrent formation of 
novel ones. This cues a new cycle of embedding, overembeddedness, dissolution of extant ties, 
and the simultaneous search for and formation of novel ones. 
That the search for novel partners most likely coincides with a decline in the number of 
extant, embedded partnerships has several reasons, three of which we mention here. First, a 
firm’s capacity to maintain external partnerships is limited. Therefore, investing time and effort 
in certain partnerships necessarily bounds investments in others.
2
 Assuming that firms ultimately 
prefer to enter the most productive partnerships, they thus face the trade-off of maintaining less 
productive partnerships versus engaging in more productive others. Second, closely related to the 
previous reason, unlike many interpersonal relationships, inter-firm partnerships ultimately serve 
economic purposes to the firms involved. Although these economic purposes need not be 
reflected in immediate or direct returns—e.g., status consequences of affiliation with certain 
(groups of) firms may take time to surface—it is fair to assume that trust and shared norms are of 
little use in the absence of (longer-term) economic benefits. Third, the endogenous mechanisms 
driving firms’ embeddedness in their partnership networks cause local informational, cognitive 
                                                 
2
  This does not necessarily mean that a firm’s capacity to manage partnerships is constant over 
time. It may increase as cooperative experience feeds into its ability to evaluate and absorb 
external information, see e.g. Gulati (1999), Powell  (1996), and Powell and Grodal (2005). 
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and normative convergence within such networks (cf. Baum and Ingram, 2002). The flow of 
novel information and the concurrent emergence of new mental images of the cooperative 
landscape that result from a firm’s involvement with nonlocal firms are, more likely than not, in 
dispute with extant local representations of this landscape. 

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At the level of possible dyadic overembeddedness, empirical work by e.g. Gulati (1995a) 
and Rosenkopf (2001) indicates an inverted U-shaped, curvilinear, relationship between the 
number of previous partnerships between two firms and the likelihood of valuable new 
partnership formation between them. Fear of over-dependence on specific partners, declining 
useful information exchanges and decreasing opportunities for learning from these partners 
appear to be main indicators of possible overembeddedness of partnerships and their sponsoring 
firms. 
Continuous partnership formation and the concomitant information exchanges between 
two firms might eventually create certain similarities between these partners (cf. Gomes-Casseres 
 2006; Mowery  1996). At some point in time, this will have a negative effect on the 
potential value of an ever-increasing partnership formation process between the firms (Mowery 
 1996; Saxton 1997; Uzzi 1996b). Consequently, in terms of the aforementioned possibly 
multiplex nature of dyadic embeddedness, firms may at a certain point in time decide to ‘de-
multiplexify’ their simultaneous partnerships in a dyad as to maintain a certain degree of 
flexibility for future tie formation (Uzzi 1996a). Although multiplexity adds to appropriate 
governance of interdependencies between firms, it may also saturate the dyad and lead to the loss 
of its momentum. 
Rosenkopf  (2001) provide a detailed understanding of the dyadic embeddedness of 
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partnership formation by relating both joint technical committee activity and previous dyadic 
partnerships to new partnership formation between two firms. Their data show that both joint 
technical committee activity and previous dyadic alliances individually have an inverted U-
shaped relationship to new partnership formation. Moreover, the interaction of these two 
phenomena also negatively influences dyad formation—suggesting that, beyond a certain 
threshold, the interplay between various elements of dyadic embeddedness apparently leads to 
over-entrenchment of the dyad, decreasing informational returns, and to consecutive decreases in 
the formation of valuable new partnerships. A direct consequence, we believe, will be that the 
firms involved start searching for novel partners and gradually dissolve extant patnerships. 
The formation of partnerships by IBM in the information technology industry provides an 
interesting illustration of this potential dyadic overembeddedness effect. Figures 2 and 3 present 
IBM’s ego network based on newly formed R&D partnerships for the periods 1990-94 and 1995-
99, respectively.
3
 Dotted lines represent 1 - 3 R&D partnerships between firms, whereas solid 
lines indicate 4 - 9 partnerships and thick lines represent 10 or more R&D partnerships. One of 
the main observations in these network plots is that during the first half of the 1990s, IBM 
appeared to be well embedded in close-knit R&D cooperation through a series of multiple dyadic 
alliances with four firms: Apple, Siemens, Toshiba and Hewlett-Packard (see Figure 2). 
Most illustrative is the case of the IBM-Apple collaboration. The two created eight R&D 
                                                 
3
  The network plots result from a two-step procedure. First, all firms’ MDS coordinates are 
generated in a two-dimensional space, based on R&D partnering data from the MERIT-CATI 
database. Second, we use the network visualization software tool Najojo (see the Appendix) to 
add firm labels to the nodes and connect the nodes based on the number of partnerships among 
the firms in IBM’s ego network. 
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partnerships in 1991, followed by five partnerships in 1993. In the following three years, IBM 
and Apple annually introduced a small number of two or three partnerships but the opportunities 
for further collaboration at such an extensive scale appear to have diminished during the second 
half of the 1990s, when most partnerships were terminated and no new R&D partnerships were 
established (see also Hagedoorn  2001). The R&D partnerships formed by IBM and Siemens, 
IBM and Toshiba, and IBM and Hewlett-Packard portray a somewhat similar pattern. In a short 
period during the first half of the 1990s, IBM created seventeen R&D partnerships with Apple, 
ten with Siemens, nine with Toshiba, and seven with Hewlett-Packard. 
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During the second half of the 1990s, most of the existing R&D partnerships were only 
continued for some time but R&D collaboration was not extended at the same level and with the 
same degree of intensity (see Figure 3). IBM started extensive collaborative efforts on joint R&D 
with a different set of firms with which it had no or only few prior R&D partnerships. During that 
period, IBM established multiple R&D partnerships with AT&T, Intel, Motorola, Netscape, 
Novell, Oracle, and Sun-Microsystems. Apparently, opportunities for further R&D cooperation 
with individual firms from the first local group of partners—in which IBM was well-embedded 
through multiple dyadic ties—had dried up in a relatively short period of time and other firms 
became attractive partners for R&D collaboration. 
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At the level of inter-organizational embeddedness, the phenomenon of overembeddedness 
occurs in networks of partnering firms when they become locked-in within densely connected 
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sub-networks (groups, cliques or blocks). In such case, groups of well-connected firms become 
isolated from others in the broader network of (potential) partners. Some contributions show the 
nonlinear, or inverted U-shaped, effects of inter-organizational embeddedness on various 
performance outcomes at the firm level. For example, Uzzi (1996b) found that high levels of 
inter-organizational embeddedness through ‘embedded ties’ result in significantly higher 
organizational failure rates. 
As suggested by e.g. Duysters  (2003), Gargiulo and Benassi (2000) and Gomes-
Casseres (1996), inter-organizational overembeddedness leads to excessively cohesive networks 
that concentrate on inter-firm partnerships within existing groups of partners. Information about 
potential partners outside the existing sub-networks does not reach the participants, and the group 
of partners becomes inflexible and inert, while the number of valuable new partnerships declines 
over time.  
For example, Garcia-Pont and Nohria (2002) show, in the global automobile industry, that 
initially inter-organizational embeddedness positively influences new partnership formation but 
that it is beyond a certain intra-group density threshold that the probability for new tie formation 
decreases significantly. Firms may even implicitly experience social pressures from their partners 
to replicate their ties within their own network, e.g. to prevent knowledge spillover effects 
outside their existing network. This is somewhat akin to Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993: 1340) 
who mention “… the constraints that community norms put on individual action and receptivity 
to outside culture …”. Thus, an implicit expectation of loyalty to other network members can 
prevent firms from allying with firms from competing groups (Gulati  2000) as this might 
result in conflicting interests among partners (Nohria and Garcia-Pont 1991). Hence, certain 
potential outside partners are not part of a firm’s choice set when they have ties to competing 
groups. In this way, competing partnership groups can foreclose further partnering opportunities 
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with non-group members (Gimeno 2004; Gomes-Casseres 1996). As a consequence, potentially 
interesting outside partners are simply excluded from partner selection and, based on their initial 
choices, firms can become locked-in within their own group of partners (Kim  2006).  
Gargiulo and Benassi (2000) and Uzzi (1997) point at the danger of being cognitively 
locked-in when the rigidity among group members will increase the likelihood that they are 
isolated from firms outside of their own network. The group of partners functions as a filter that 
selects the information and new perspectives for its members. In the end, an inter-
organizationally over-embedded group of partners consists mainly of exclusively connected, 
strongly embedded inter-firm ties (Uzzi 1997) where firms face a strategic gridlock (Gomes-
Casseres 1996) as they only engage in local search for partners within their own network of 
partnerships. 
The understanding of the sub-optimal cohesiveness in strategic groups within particular 
industries (where strategic groups are defined as collectives of interacting firms) also reflects the 
notion of inter-organizational overembeddedness. As Thomas and Carroll (1994) explain, stable 
and dense networks of firms can be seen as robust building blocks of strategic groups. However, 
once these dense networks within strategic groups become insensitive to external signals of 
potentially valuable change, their robustness and stability become sub-optimal. Also, the level of 
inertia frustrates further economic growth within these strategic groups. Thus, after a certain 
threshold level of inter-organizational embeddedness has been reached, the likelihood that social 
structural mechanisms supersede rationality with respect to external initiatives—such as inter-
firm partnership formation—will steadily amplify and, consequently, hinder effective economic 
action (cf. Gulati and Westphal 1999; Uzzi 1997: 59). 
Firms’ cognitive lock-in and the decreasing marginal informational and substantial returns 
they experience will influence their performance and partnering behaviors. We expect that firms 
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who become cognitively locked-in within a group of partners will only endure the negative 
informational consequences of such lock-in up to a certain threshold. Although research 
documents that firms allow such overembedded alliances to persist (Inkpen and Ross 2001), their 
negative performance impact will at some point in time cue the search for novel, nonlocal 
partners (see e.g., Baum  2005), even despite group-level pressures to replicate local ties. 
Even absent such dramatic negative performance effects, firms may start to look for nonlocal 
contacts as to avoid the overdependence on key local players in case such players malfunction 
themselves (cf. Uzzi 1997).  
The network in the information technology industry from the 1990s, in which IBM was 
well placed, represents an interesting example of inter-organizational overembeddedness. During 
the first half of the 1990s, the core of the wider inter-firm network in which IBM participated 
consisted of multiple partnerships between Apple, Hewlett-Packard, IBM itself, Siemens, and 
Toshiba. This created a dense multi-dyadic network of computer hardware manufacturers with a 
variety of interests in other sub-sectors of information technology. IBM became well embedded 
in a network of R&D partnerships of firms with similar research objectives that were all well 
connected to each other. However, this group of firms, with IBM as a major player, appeared to 
have become over-embedded. During the early years of the 1990s, the firms mentioned in the 
above created a densely populated clique of cooperating firms that quickly dismantled during the 
second half of the 1990s. During that period, a new inter-organizational network gradually 
emerged through a variety of new R&D partnerships within another group of firms. IBM also 
became part of this new network and so did many other computer hardware firms. Because of 
these changes in the mid-1990s, IBM became embedded in a new network of multiple R&D 
partnerships with other players such as AT&T, Intel, Motorola, Netscape, Novell, Oracle, and 
Sun-Microsystems.  
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As a further illustration, Figure 4 shows the number of newly established R&D 
partnerships with firms from both the original as well as the new group of partners. Whereas 
during the first half of the 1990s IBM created 43 partnerships with Apple, Hewlett-Packard, 
Siemens, and Toshiba, it only formed 24 with these firms between 1995 and 1999. In contrast, 
the partners that obtained prevalence in IBM’s partnership portfolio during the second half of the 
1990s―through the formation of 40 new partnerships―participated in only 12 partnerships with 
IBM between 1990 and 1994. IBM’s group of most important allies (in terms of numbers of 
partnerships) thus changed drastically, especially considering the fact that our data indicate that 
the biggest changes actually occurred only after 1996. 
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Obviously, given the relatively large number of potential partnerships at the level of 
environmental embeddedness, we expect that the potential degree of overembeddedness at the 
level of industries is limited. Nevertheless, some research indicates that the finite possibility of 
increasing partnership formation at this level is not just a theoretical notion. For instance, a study 
of partnership formation in the electronics industry by Park and Ungson (1997) demonstrates 
that, given the degree of partnership formation in that industry, inter-sectoral partnerships with 
firms from other industries appear to have a higher likelihood of continuation than intra-sectoral 
partnerships that focus on firms from the electronics sector per se. 
The tendency to ‘cavalierly’ use inter-firm partnerships in the belief that they are the key 
to success in particular industries (Inkpen and Ross 2001) may lead to saturation and decreasing 
numbers of newly-established inter-firm partnerships. Partnerships that, often unconsciously, 
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result from herd behavior in some way lack an inherent ‘raison d’être’ in terms of their 
substantial and relational aspects. This may lead firms to be increasingly dissatisfied with given 
partnerships as firms are unconscious of the discrepancy between, on the one hand, the exact 
environmental forces that drove them to engage in certain partnerships in the first place and, on 
the other hand, their (misplaced) expectations given these forces.
4
 Ceteris paribus, we expect that 
the dissatisfaction with intra-industry partnerships will lead to shifts in the firm-level pattern of 
intra- versus inter-industry partnership formation. 
Relatedly, increasing numbers of ties across groups of densely connected firms will lead 
to decreases in the requisite differentiation among (groups of) firms that is foundational to the 
achievement of competitive advantages (Baum and Ingram 2002; Schilling and Phelps 2007). 
Driven by increased numbers of industry-wide connections among firms, the increased 
convergence of the knowledge base underlying an industry’s main activities likely drives out the 
variety necessary for firms to progress and differentiate themselves from others. 
The inter-firm R&D partnerships in the information technology industry illustrate the 
possible effect of environmental overembeddedness on changes in the network. During the early 
1990s the emphasis in the inter-firm network in information technology in general, and for IBM 
in particular, was on R&D partnerships in computer hardware and related activities such as 
computer-based telecommunication systems and supporting software. Given the limited number 
of firms that were active in these particular activities and given their focus on somewhat similar 
interests, many of them started to establish R&D partnerships in other information technology 
fields and in sectors outside information technology. These new inter-sectoral R&D partnerships 
                                                 
4
  We note, however, that the performance consequences of imitation are likely contingent on the 
specific nature of the cooperative environment, see e.g. Soda  (2008).  
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concentrated on related fields such as microelectronics, software, various internet-related 
products and services, and a host of multimedia technologies. 
Some additional data on the R&D partnerships of IBM illustrate the ramifications of 
environmental overembeddedness for IBM’s ego network. Although IBM’s ego network does not 
present the industry’s whole partnership network, it reflects very clearly the trend that can be 
observed in the industry at large (see also Cloodt  2006, 2007). Between 1990 and 1999, 
IBM alone established new R&D ties with 163 different firms. During the period 1990-1994, it 
tied to 95 firms. Of the 93 firms it tied up with between 1995 and 1999, it had only set up R&D 
partnerships with 25 during the previous period 1990-1994. What this shows is that of IBM’s 
entire R&D partnership portfolio during 1990-1999, only 15% of the firms served as R&D 
partner in both 1990-1994 as well as in 1995-1999. Most of IBM’s newly established ties in the 
latter half of the 90s were thus of an un-embedded nature (68 out of 93), see also Figures 2 and 3. 
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As indicated by e.g. Hagedoorn (2006) and Uzzi (1997), the nested interaction of different 
levels of social embeddedness can jointly affect the negative impact of overembeddedness even 
further than in the case of single level effects of overembeddedness. Figure 5 summarizes our 
understanding of the effects of the growth in embeddedness and its effect on the firm-level choice 
of local, embedded partners, versus nonlocal, novel partners. Similar to Hagedoorn’s (2006) 
theoretical understanding of the strengthening, positive, and multiplicative effects across levels of 
embeddedness in determining rates of inter-firm partnership formation, we also expect such 
effects at increasing levels of embeddedness. Essentially, such multiplicative effects progress 
along a continuum, the effects of which we understand to reflect an aggregation of parabolic, 
inverted U-shaped effects at the individual embeddedness levels as depicted in Figure 1. In other 
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words, at each of the three levels of embeddedness we described, we expect a parabolic effect to 
find place. The difference among the progression of these three parabolic effects is the time it 
takes for the individual curves to evolve, which should aid in the empirical identification of such 
effects in a longitudinal research design.
5
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As presented in Figure 5, we expect a positive effect of the growth of embeddedness at 
each level on the degree of overembeddedness, which will ultimately cause a shift in the nature of 
newly established partnerships. As indicated before, this shift has two faces, the order and 
intertwinement of which is to be identified empirically. First, firms will quit forming local 
partnerships and gradually dissolve extant local partnerships. Second, firms will start engaging in 
nonlocal partnerships. 
The expected curvilinear effect of increasing levels of embeddedness on the growth of 
valuable newlocal partnerships (see Figure 1) is more pronounced for various combinations, i.e. 
interactions, of different levels of embeddedness than for individual levels of social 
embeddedness. Given the expected effects of overembeddedness at different levels, based on 
theory development and the empirical evidence from previous research, we postulate that at a 
given point in time the effects of overembeddedness on partnership formation will differ for each 
of these different levels of embeddedness. Ceteris paribus, dyadic and inter-organizational 
                                                 
5
  Such a design ideally spans several decades; see e.g. Gulati and Gargiulo (1999: 1478) who 
indicate that their design that spans 10 years was effectively too short to observe parabolic sector-
level phenomena of interest. See also Hagedoorn (2002). 
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embeddedness will see the effects of overembeddedness at an earlier point in time than 
environmental embeddedness. We also expect differences between dyadic and inter-
organizational levels of embeddedness, where the stage of dyadic overembeddedness will be 
reached earlier than the stage of inter-organizational overembeddedness. 
We briefly return to the illustration of the possible effects of overembeddedness for IBM. 
It is obvious that, after a number years of intense R&D collaboration, the number of options for 
continued R&D partnering between IBM and Apple had grown limited compared to the potential 
number of other interesting options in IBM’s network that were still open to the firm. In addition, 
given the somewhat limited scope of the core of the network of R&D partnerships of computer 
firms in which IBM operated during the first half the 1990s, there were still multiple other 
opportunities for R&D partnership formation outside its existing network. Hence: 
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Along similar lines, the development of groups of connected firms will have an earlier 
impact on patterns of partnership formation than industry-based forces that develop rather 
sluggishly over time. Therefore: 
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In addition to the expected greater impact of the interaction of different levels of 
embeddedness compared to the effect of individual levels of embeddedness, we also anticipate 
that the interaction of various levels of social embeddedness will have alternative effects. 
Following the various expected increasing effects at different levels of embeddedness and the 
empirical evidence from other studies, we postulate that at a given point in time the effects of the 
interaction for different levels of embeddedness will have an increasing effect on the 
overembeddedness of new partnership formation. However, again, there are a larger number of 
potential partnerships at the level of environmental embeddedness, where the risk of 
overembeddedness is smaller than at the level of inter-organizational embeddedness and certainly 
at the level of dyadic embeddedness. This implies that various combinations of interacting levels 
of social embeddedness of inter-firm partnerships generate differential outcomes as to their 
aggregate effect on new partnership formation.  
In the context of the exemplary setting of IBM and the information technology industry, 
this implies that the level of overembeddedness of IBM’s R&D partnerships with Apple, in 
combination with IBM’s well-embedded network with other computer hardware manufacturers 
during the first half of the 1990s, was very high and with increasingly limited opportunity for 
useful future partnership formation. Consequently: 
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To date, the literature on the relationship between social embeddedness and inter-firm 
partnerships has typically stressed the positive effects of embeddedness on inter-firm partnership 
formation. However, increasing numbers of inter-firm partnerships at different levels of social 
embeddedness can generate negative effects that we characterized as the gloomy side of 
embeddedness through overembeddedness. 
We point at some of the specific multi-level effects of the gloomy side of embeddedness 
on new partnership formation and the temporal nature of developments of these effects. In 
particular, we expect that the interaction between dyadic overembeddedness—the redundant 
relationship between two firms through long-term repeated ties—and inter-organizational 
overembeddedness—through crowded groups or congested cliques of exclusively cooperating 
firms—is a major cause of overembeddedness. In the end, the overembeddedness will become 
evident through the actual redundancy of newly created local inter-firm partnerships, the 
increased dissolution of such partnerships, and the subsequent formation of—what are to the 
firm—novel, nonlocal partnerships. 
Necessarily, our conception of firms’ embeddedness in networks of external partnerships 
has limitations. Two are conspicuous. First, our model does not specifically identify exogenous 
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drivers of partnership formation. Our focus on the gloomy side of embeddedness has led us to 
focus predominantly on endogenous mechanisms that determine the choice of local versus 
nonlocal partners. We note, however, that firms’ specific choice of nonlocal partners will without 
doubt reflect more exogenous factors, such as e.g. the distribution of technological and financial 
resources among firms (cf. Ahuja 2000; Baum and Ingram 2002; Gulati and Gargiulo 1999). 
Second, we cannot pinpoint the exact sequencing of the dissolution of local partnerships on the 
one hand, and the formation of nonlocal partnerships on the other. At any rate, the empirical 
identification of how firms sequence these actions, and the mechanisms that underlie this 
sequencing, poses a formidable research challenge. After all, firms seldom—if at all—make 
public the dissolution of partnerships with the same aplomb that characterizes the announcement 
of new partnerships. This thus requires careful quantitative 
 qualitative analyses of 
networking processes (such as the mixed-methods explanatory design in Madhavan  2008). 
Overall, we hope to have illustrated that building an understanding of the nested, multi-
level implications of overembeddedness ultimately necessitates the consideration of complex 
interactions between those levels over time. Although temporal differences in the impact of levels 
of embeddedness on inter-firm partnership formation require longitudinal research designs 
spanning decades, the upshot is that they allow for pealing apart the macro-, meso-, and micro-
level drivers of interest. We hope to have encouraged efforts in this direction. 
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To visualize the ego networks of IBM, we use of our own network visualization software tool 
Najojo. This tool is capable of visualizing large, dense networks involving more than 500 firms. 
There are two separate input (text) files underlying the generation of networks in Najojo: one 
holding the MDS coordinates for each of the individual firms participating in the network and a 
different one holding all unique firm pairs and their numbers of partnerships. 
Based on the first input file, Najojo determines whether it visualizes the particular 
network in landscape or portrait orientation. As a second step in the visualization process, Najojo 
divides the landscape in X points and it then maps the firms’ coordinates held by the first input 
file onto those points, visualizing them as dots. While creating this ‘scatter’ plot, the program 
makes sure that the relations among dots remain constant and that dots belonging to different 
firms do not overlap. Next, the program places firm labels with the dots in such a way that they 
do not overlap with other labels or dots. Najojo variably determines the font size of firm labels 
depending on network density and the number of firms participating in the network. 
Based on the second input file, Najojo then visualizes the total number of partnerships 
entered into by all unique firm pairs making up the network. The tool first identifies both research 
partners, i.e. the beginning and ending dots, and subsequently draws polybezier lines between 
these dots, making sure that these lines do not cross dots belonging to firms that are not part of 
the partnership. The type and thickness of lines indicate the number of partnerships between 
firms. 
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Figure 1. The relationship between (over)embeddedness and valuable new partnership formation 
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Figure 2. IBM’s ego network based on newly established R&D partnerships in 1990-1994 
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Figure 3. IBM’s ego network based on newly established R&D partnerships in 1995-1999 
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Figure 4. Numbers of IBM’s newly established R&D partnerships with firms in two main groups, 
1990-94 and 1995-99 
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@
 The grey columns represent IBM’s R&D partnerships with Apple, Hewlett-Packard, Siemens, and Toshiba. 
The black columns represent its R&D partnerships with AT&T, Intel, Motorola, Netscape, Novell, Oracle, and Sun-
Microsystems. 
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Figure 5. The interaction of the growth in environmental, inter-organizational and dyadic embeddedness and their effects on 
overembeddedness and partnership formation 
 
 
 
